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Abstract 
Purpose: This paper raises important questions from the different perspectives on autism research 
that arose from a seminar on autism and technology, held as part of an ESRC-funded series on 
innovative technologies for autism.  
Design/methodology/approach: The paper focuses on the roles of technology in understanding 
questions about different perspectives on autism: how do people on the spectrum see neurotypicals 
(people without autism) and vice versa?; how do we use eye-gaze differently from each other?; how 
might technology influence what is looked at and how we measure this?; what differences might 
there be in how people use imitation of others?; and finally, how should we study and treat any 
differences? 
Findings: We synthesise common themes from invited talks and responses. The audience discussions 
highlighted the ways in which we take account of human variation, how we can understand the 
perspective of another, particularly across third-person and second-person approaches in research, 
and how researchers and stakeholders engage with each other.  
Originality/value: We argue that the question of perspectives is important for considering how 
people with autism and neurotypical people interact in everyday contexts, and how researchers 
frame their research questions and methods. We propose that stakeholders and researchers can 
fruitfully engage directly in discussions of research, in ways that benefit both research and practice. 
  
Introduction 
Parsons, Yuill, Brosnan and Good (2015) discussed questions arising from the first of an ESRC-funded 
seminar series (2014-16) that is focusing on the development, application and evaluation of 
technologies for children and adults on the autism spectrum, and their families, entitled: ‘Innovative 
technologies for autism: critical reflections on digital bubbles’ (‘Digital Bubbles’ for short). The first 
seminar in the series explored some of the social considerations of technology development, for 
example, whether there are negative effects of technology use and whether maintaining a 
distinction between the idea of ‘real’ and ‘digital’ worlds is appropriate (Parsons et al., 2015). This 
paper debates questions arising from the main themes of the second seminar in the series, which 
focused on developmental aspects of technology research and application, specifically addressing 
the questions: Are aspects of development in autism best seen as delayed or different? How can 
developmental psychology inform understanding and intervention? 
Exploring differences in perspective 
The second Digital Bubbles seminar, held in March 2015, at the University of Sussex brought 
together academics, people working in the field in education, health and charitable sectors, parent 
groups and people with ASC to focus on the role of technology in understanding and supporting the 
development of social interaction in autism. A common theme in the talks concerned perspective, 
that is, how we understand ourselves as the objects of other people’s attention, the different ways 
that technology enters into this relationship and how we might bridge gaps in understanding across 
the very broad spectrum from neurotypical to autistic. We use these terms to reflect those used in 
the positive reframing of autistic identities through the neurodiversity movement (e.g. Kapp, 
Gillespie-Lynch, Sherman & Hutman, 2013).  The introductory address by Richard Brown, CEO of 
Autism Sussex, put into relief some stark figures on access to employment and services for adults 
with autism. For example, there are 10,000 people with autism in Sussex; and 80% of adults on the 
autism spectrum in Sussex are unemployed. This was an important reminder of the wider context in 
which the discussion of research takes places and why research into the things that really matter to 
people with autism is so vital (Pellicano, Dinsmore & Charman, 2014). 
Indeed, reminders about the different perspectives on autism, and on autism research, were a main 
feature of the day, not least in raising questions about from whose perspective research is initiated, 
designed and discussed. This was especially the case for our second speaker, Mark Bushby, an 
autistic self-advocate and member of Autism Sussex, who provided an insightful account of what 
‘neurotypicals’ look like from the perspective of someone with autism. He described the possible 
diagnostic criteria for ‘neurotypical disorder’ such as excessive concern about what other people 
think of them and a delusional belief in the ability to read others’ minds 
(https://neurotypicalsyndrome.wordpress.com/2011/08/04/nt-syndrome-diagnostic-criteria). While 
producing good-natured humour, Mark’s analysis was also a thought-provoking way of highlighting 
the pejorative nature of deficit-focused labelling of characteristics that many (though by no means 
all) consider part of natural human variation (Kapp et al., 2013). 
These two talks from Autism Sussex framed the following three talks from academic researchers, 
who each took very different approaches to studying autism, illustrating the very diverse directions 
from which researchers start, both personally and in terms of theory. These different perspectives 
very rarely collide: papers are published in very different journals and audiences across conferences 
may seldom overlap, so this was a chance to compare different perspectives, one of the main aims 
of the seminar series.  
Using virtual agents to explore eye-gaze in autism 
 Ouriel Grynszpan from the Université Pierre et Marie Curie in Paris, situates his research at the 
intersection between computer science, clinical psychology and affective and cognitive 
neuroscience, a developing field that seeks to use new techniques of investigating patterns of brain 
activity to throw light on emotional and thinking processes. He has used virtual and physical agents 
to assess and support social interaction in people with autism. Grynszpan’s research has detected 
that, when watching social scenes in a film, the eye movements of people with ASC are very 
different from neurotypical people, with the former showing less of a focus on the eye region of 
faces (Grynszpan et al., 2009). The researchers used eye-tracking information to provide immediate 
feedback to people with ASC about the potential effects that lack of eye gaze might have on the 
people with whom they interact. This was done by giving people continuous visual feedback, 
imposed on the image of an avatar, showing the direction of the participant’s gaze towards the 
avatar. Grynszpan et al. (2012) suggest these virtual reality techniques might be used for training 
gaze. This talk naturally led to questions and comments from the audience about different 
perspectives on eye gaze. Firstly, there are large individual differences in eye gaze within the ASC 
population and people may actively choose to focus on different parts of a scene, sometimes as a 
way to manage visual hypersensitivities or information overload. Secondly, there is also a question 
about whose lead is followed: interventions such as Intensive Interaction (Caldwell, 2006) involve a 
therapist following the lead of a person with autism, whereas other interventions seek to teach 
neurotypical patterns of behaviour to people with ASC. 
Using technology for exploring imitation in autism 
The question of who leads and who follows was taken up in a different way by Antonia Hamilton 
from the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience at University College London, whose research sits more 
squarely within experimental cognitive neuroscience and a formal cognitive model of social 
cognition, Social Topdown Response Modulation (STORM; Wang & Hamilton, 2012). Hamilton 
focused on the topic of social imitation in children, and on differences that occur in children with 
autism. There is huge current interest in psychology in how children develop the capacity to imitate 
for learning, e.g. to learn about the physical world, but this talk focused on social imitation – and in 
particular mimicry, when we copy the way someone does something, making a social connection 
between the mimic and the mimicked. It is an intriguing finding that even toddlers show over-
imitation i.e. copying the style of an action even when it is not needed to reach the goal of an action. 
Children with autism showed a much lower tendency to over-imitate (Marsh et al, 2013) and 
Hamilton’s studies suggested complex differences in the way that children with ASC control their 
imitation behaviour, with links to different patterns of brain development (Hamilton, 2013). As the 
discussion showed, the talk was a useful reminder that we should be aware of common strengths in 
autism – imitating more rationally and less slavishly than in typical development -- and of the 
important questions it raises about what over-imitation is for, and why neurotypical people might do 
so much of it even when it seems irrational to do so.  
Our audience were keen to see the relation between these tightly-controlled lab studies, often using 
virtual agents, and everyday behaviour with flesh-and-blood people.  Hamilton highlighted the 
power of virtual reality tools to test theories in well-controlled and replicable ways, triangulated 
with data from more naturalistic settings.  Practically speaking, virtual reality might provide a safe 
space in which to try out new social behaviours without offending anyone, but might not provide the 
social realism of the everyday world. A person with autism may often like to have a set of structured 
rules, but questions from the audience challenged whether this is always possible or helpful. An 
example was provided about reciting a joke you have heard someone else tell to great laughter, but 
having it fall flat. What are the subtle differences that mean a joke might work in one situation when 
someone else tells it, but not in another? Rules might differ between cultures and subcultures, and 
real interactions might fluctuate in very fluid and subtle ways. This raises questions for technology 
research, including: who is to determine what the ‘correct’ way to behave is, and can technology 
offer experimental control while also providing authentic and subtle (ecologically valid) contexts in 
which responses can be studied? 
The value of researching interpersonal engagement in autism 
This brought us to the distinctive cultural approach pioneered by Vasu Reddy, Professor of 
Developmental and Cultural Psychology and Director of the Centre for Situated Action and 
Communication at the University of Portsmouth. She described the long history of the concept of 
‘engagement’, the way that living beings connect with each other: something that is hard to define 
but easy to recognise. It works at all levels, interacting with things or with people –so when babies 
first start stepping movements, the precise dynamics of how they do this interacts with the 
properties of the surface they step on, and the interaction is even more powerful when it is 
disrupted. Parent and child show an intricate connected system of behaviour when the child 
anticipates being lifted from the floor.  Reddy, Markova and Wallot (2013) and Trevarthen’s work 
(Trevarthen & Reddy, 2007) woke psychologists up to the intricate ‘dance’ between mothers and 
babies in early proto-conversations, using the ‘still face’ paradigm, where mothers let their faces go 
blank during an interaction, which produces real distress in babies, and, as Reddy noted, in their 
mothers too. This brought us right back to Grynszpan’s very hi-tech approach to studying how gaze 
makes us self-aware, from the very different perspective of what it means to be an object of 
another’s gaze. Reddy was keen to emphasise that being aware of oneself as an object of gaze is 
shown in behaviour well before psychologists have traditionally attributed ‘self-awareness’ to 
infants, and she traced the expansion of this awareness through the first two years of life. Despite 
this very different approach, the idea chimes with Grynszpan’s studies of people’s responses to 
being an object of regard, suggesting that children with autism differ in their awareness of self.  
Interviews with parents of children with autism and with Down’s syndrome show that the latter 
engage in much more clowning and teasing in the first year of life compared to the former (Reddy, 
Williams & Vaughan, 2002). This raises a crucial question about intervention: Do differences in 
engagement mean we ought to teach people with autism how to connect or does it mean we should 
engage people in a wholly different manner – perhaps by engaging a bit less directly? Bushby’s talk 
suggested that there might be a desire both for clear explicit rules, but also for allowing some space 
and stepping back from (neurotypical expectations of) social interaction. Comments from 
participants highlighted questions about how much adaptation each ‘side’ of the spectrum should 
make –why should we be asking people with ASC to look at eyes of others if they find this 
unsettling? How can research make use of a first-person perspective of ASC, and the second-person 
perspective of being in engagement, proposed by Reddy? More broadly, how should researchers, 
service-providers and service-users engage with each other? Who sets the agenda and how do we 
communicate with each other? (cf. Pellicano et al., 2014). 
From cognitivism to embodiment: a spectrum of approaches 
Finally, our plenary discussant Hanne de Jaegher, from the University of the Basque Country, 
articulated some of the many different spectra illustrated in the talks. She highlighted new 
‘embodied’ approaches in psychology – taking into account that thinking is not just a function of 
disembodied minds (a cognitive perspective), but involves the body and the environment –as in the 
stepping babies, whose limbs react to the surfaces they encounter (Ulrich, Ulrich & Kinzler, 1998). 
The closely related approach of dynamical systems, derived from mathematical theory and driven by 
the seminal work of Maturana and Varela (1987),  treats humans as self-organising systems whose 
interactions with each other need to be studied dynamically within their environments, rather than 
in terms of static dispositions – looking at coordination of organism with environment rather than 
looking within the head. De Jaegher presented an enactivist approach to autism, arguing that this 
overcomes piecemeal individualistic approaches that separate thinking, feeling, perceiving and 
interacting (de Jaegher, 2013) and described a spectrum running between enactivism at one end and 
cognitivism at the other. The methodological implications of studying interactions rather than 
individuals need to be taken seriously by researchers (Yuill, 2014). This plenary talk raised questions 
about how this methodological range might apply to the spectrum we were here to discuss, 
between autism and ‘neurotypical’. This question also relates to intervention, specifically: Should we 
‘teach autistic people non-autistic rules’ or should each of us alter how we engage with the ‘other’, 
based on a more informed understanding of cultural identities and differences (cf. Davidson, 2008)? 
There was no resolution to these questions on the day (nor would we expect there to be) but the 
themes of whether and how research is meaningful for people with autism and their families, and 
the starting points we use in deciding what is meaningful, were clear, and echoed discussion from 
the first seminar (Parsons et al., 2015). 
Another spectrum that became clear on the day was between the individual, with mindreading 
scripts in the head, and the dyadic engagement of a pair in interactional synchrony. This spectrum 
was reflected in each of the talks: Reddy’s interviews on how parents engage with their children as 
objects of attention; Grynszpan’s work on presenting dynamic information about one’s own gaze; 
and Hamilton’s focus on styles of social imitation behaviour – copying for the sake of being the 
same. An additional crucial underlying spectrum is between practitioner and researcher, which was 
cogently expressed by practitioners in the audience, contrasting the seeking of funding for a major 3-
year research programme with the everyday struggle to fund a laptop for someone with autism as 
assistive technology. This was another reminder about how we justify and discuss what is 
meaningful and useful in supporting autistic people and their families. 
Importantly, De Jaegher showed us how the spectra need not be as alienating or as irreconcilable as 
they seemed: so Grynszpan’s work helps neurotypical people to see through the eyes of a person 
with ASC, while Bushby’s explanation of what it is like to be overwhelmed by sensory information 
might be, for neurotypical people, imagining themselves being lost in a busy airport in a foreign 
country. This was described as ‘thinking in autistic’ (Vermeulen, 2001): taking another perspective 
requires considering what is relevant to this person in this moment. These themes raise questions 
for research:  What are the useful strategies as well as challenges that have been found in 
developing, researching and evaluating technologies for autism? In what ways have ‘users’ been 
involved in the design, development and evaluation of the technologies? These questions were the 
focus of the third seminar at the University of Bath in July 2015, which examined the methodological 
aspects of technology research and autism.  
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